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RECONCILING WELFARE DEVOLUTION AND DUE
PROCESS PROTECTION
A Response to Professor Cimini
CHERYL M. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Cimini argues that the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act1 (PRWORA or Welfare Reform
Act) represents a progression from public assistance as a federal statu-
tory entitlement to a contractual model of welfare receipt.2 In Profes-
sor Cimini's words, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program created a legitimate expectation of benefits for
those meeting statutory eligibility requirements.' Further, because
these benefits were construed as "constitutionally protected property,
recipients of such benefits were entitled to due process protec-
tions. . ,. "' The Welfare Reform Act moved public assistance towards
a "devolved contractual model,"' with a concomitant lessening of gov-
ernment accountability and due process safeguards for welfare recipi-
ents.' Although Professor Cimini laments this erosion, she
simultaneously finds seeds of salvation in the devolved contractual
model, arguing that it will protect welfare recipients from the arbi-
trary exercise of power by state welfare administrations.7
This response takes the view that Professor Cimini's argument-
that both implied and express contracts govern the TANF recipient-
government benefit exchange and can serve as the bases of due pro-
cess protectionS-is a plausible tool to serve as a counter to the revo-
* Associate Professor, Policy Sciences and Political Science, University of Maryland,
Baltimore County.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (Supp. V 1999).
2. Christine Cimini, The New Contract: Welfare Reform, Devolution, and Due Process, 61
MD. L. REv. 246, 249 (2002).
3. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (1994) (amended 1996) (providing that all
eligible families shall receive aid under the AFDC program).
4. Cimini, supra note 2, at 250.
5. Id. at 249.
6. Id. at pt. I1.
7. Id. at pt. III.
8. Id. at pts. III.A.3 and III.B.
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cation of entitlement rights wrought by the Welfare Reform Act.9 She
argues for a broader conception of entitlement based on the property
rights inherent in contracts.1t However, Professor Cimini's strategy of
redress may be based on a too optimistic reading of political will and
legal predisposition. My observation is that the political environment,
as well as the body of state court and mixed federal court welfare pol-
icy decisions, do not bode well for the likelihood that the courts will
embrace Professor Cimini's more expansive view of entitlement.
1. THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM POSED BY WELFARE DEVOLUTION
The American social compact has been altered, if not broken.
Social welfare policy discourse varies from those who think recipients
should do more for aid receipt11 to those who question whether there
is enough of a social compact between government and its less-well-off
citizens. 2
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF),
created under the 1996 Welfare Reform Act,13 does not have the enti-
tlement underpinnings of AFDC. Cash assistance is now conditional,
subject to work requirements, time limits, and behavioral and other
stipulations.14
9. The conception of an entitlement based upon property rights was put forth by
Charles A. Reich in The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964), and Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965), which assert that
society has obligations to provide support, and the individual is entitled to that support as
of right." Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare, supra, at 1256.
10. Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. III.
11. See generally MARVIN OLAsKv, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992) (analyz-
ing the history of philanthropy in America, and advocating an approach to poverty and
homelessness that emphasizes respect and individual responsibility).
12. See Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Contemporary Relief Debate, in THE
MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 45, 4547 (Fred Block et al. eds., 1987)
(criticizing the conservative attack on the welfare system, and arguing that sufficient public
support for such programs exists and should be reflected in government policy); see also
FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, THE BREAKING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL COM-
PACT 17-84 (reprint. 1997) (1967) (discussing how the decline of unions in the post-indus-
trial era, the rise of "identity politics," and "attacks on social welfare programs" result in a
weakened "social compact"); THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: Fu-
TURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECrrE 136-66, 228-49 (1995) (arguing that the So-
cial Security Act's establishment of public assistance and social insurance programs "add
up to . . . [an] incomplete version of a modern 'welfare state'" compared to European
countries).
13. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
V 1999)).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 604, 608.
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As Professor Cimini notes in her discussion of the importance of
Goldberg v. Kelly, 1 the entitlement core of AFDC evolved over time.'
6
A variety of welfare case decisions by the activist Warren Court ex-
panded the meaning of entitlement to more of an absolute right, not
just a legal obligation dependent on eligibility. 7 This expansion,
however, occurred in a political environment more focused on creat-
ing opportunity for all, much different from the current environ-
ment's emphasis on individual responsibility.1 8
Politicians and scholars now decry the harmful societal effects of
an entitlement or income-by-right ideology. 9 Similarly, a case can be
made that consistent with the larger political environment, the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, and lower federal courts, substantially nar-
rowed the rights of welfare recipients.2 ° One interpretation of the
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. See Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. I.A (discussing the entitlement analysis adopted by
the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly).
17. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 83-102
(1994) (discussing relevant Warren Court cases striking down restrictions on AFDC). For a
discussion of the limitations of the Warren Court in providing the welfare poor equal pro-
tection, see ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE
RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 84-98 (1997).
18. See MELNICK, supra note 17, at 36-38 (discussing the movement from the activism of
the Warren Court to the expansion of federal governmental responsibility); see also GARETH
DAVIES, FROM OPPORTUNITY TO ENTITLEMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION AND DECLINE OF GREAT
SOCIETY LIBERALISM 34 (1996) (discussing the declared purpose of the Economic Opportu-
nity Act of 1964, which was to open "to everyone the opportunity for education and train-
ing, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity"). The
framework of America's limited social welfare state was laid with many of the New Deal
safety net programs and expanded through President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society pro-
grams. Id. at 14; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 12, at 209-10 (describing the "War on Pov-
erty's" expansion of New Deal programs).
19. See generally DAVIES, supra note 18 (chronicling the rise of entitlement liberalism);
LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1986)
(suggesting that the permissive, rather than authoritative, nature of social programs in
America since the 1960s is to blame for the problems of poverty and unemployment that
confront the disadvantaged); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980, at 9 (1984) (arguing that modern welfare programs encourage the poor to
"behave in the short term in ways that [are] destructive in the long term," and attempting
to solve the "moral dilemma" of poverty). Theda Skocpol argues that the New Deal era's
"bifurcation of social insurance and public assistance" programs set up a framework for on-
going welfare debate about dependency and work. This bifurcation made it easier for
traditional welfare programs like AFDC to fall under attack. Theda Skocpol, The Limits of
the New Deal System and the Roots of Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 293, 295-98, 307-11 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
20. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 (1990) (supporting the Secretary of Health
and Human Services' position that "child support payments" referred exclusively to pay-
ment from absent parents); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987) (holding that the
statute in question reduced AFDC benefits, but the reduction did not constitute a taking);
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 586-87 (1975) (interpreting the Social Security Act to include
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Welfare Reform Act is that it was the culmination of decades-long at-
tacks on the welfare state.2 ' One can also construe the granting of
section 115 waivers in the early 1990s to states by the federal govern-
ment for welfare reform experimentation as license for the states to
require more obligations of recipients, the entitlement status of AFDC
notwithstanding. 22 The Welfare Reforn Act, with its fundamental
changes, was a runaway train that could not be stopped.23
Views vary on the role government should take in solving social
problems. In the 1960s a dominant value was providing a social safety
net for those whom opportunity had not.24 In the 1990s dominant
social and cultural values emphasized individual responsibility.25 Con-
servatives felt that government policy had gone far "beyond entitle-
ment" in its social welfare programs, with a concomitant decline in
individual responsibility and obligation. 2 6 Their perception was that
an entitlement to welfare created a class of people dependent on gov-
ernment largesse.
27
On the one hand, in looking at the erosion of recipient rights
produced since 1996, PRWORA detractors might contend that the
AFDC entitlement model had an important virtue. That is, because of
its virtual guarantee that those meeting the conditions of eligibility
optional, not mandatory, pregnancy benefits). For a discussion of these cases as well as
lower court decisions, see MELNICK, supra note 17, at 97-108.
21. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 19, at 91-119 (recounting the debate over welfare support
without a work requirement that ran throughout welfare reform attempts between 1969
and 1979).
22. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE WAIVERS IMPLEMENTATION: STATES
WORK TO CHANGE WELFARE CULTURE, COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, AND SERVICE DELIVERY
(1996) (examining reform efforts in Florida, Indiana, NewJersey, Virginia, and Wisconsin
that include timelimited benefits, work requirements, and family caps).
23. See David T. Ellwood, Welfare Reform as I Knew It, AM. PROSPECT, May 1, 1996, availa-
ble at http://www.prospect.org/print/v7/26/ellwood-d.html (discussing how President
Clinton lost control of the reform effort in 1995 and 1996 after the defeat of his Personal
Responsibility Act in 1994).
24. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON WELFARE 80-81 (1989) (describing President Johnson's "War on Poverty" as de-
signed to provide opportunity in the areas ofjuvenile delinquency, civil rights,job training,
and education); WALTER I. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 319-23 (6th ed.
1999) (describing the objectives of AFDC and the increase in federal funding and support
for welfare reform).
25. See TRATrNER, supra note 24, at 376-77 (describing the 1990 welfare reform efforts
to require job training and placement).
26. See MEAD, supra note 19, at 49-54 (placing the onus for failed efforts to help the
poor on a lack of obligation instilled in recipients through the failure to address "behav-
ioral problems among the poor").
27. Cf MURRAY, supra note 19, at 67-68, 148-53 (describing the expansion of federal aid
and a study finding that providing payments to individuals with incomes below a certain
level resulted in reduced work efforts by the individuals).
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would receive government assistance, AFDC provided protections
from arbitrary or unfair administrative decisions.28 As Professor
Cimini observes, no such accountability mechanisms are mandated or
exist to protect public assistance recipients under the Welfare Reform
Act.29 States can reduce or terminate recipient benefits, without due
process safeguards, for noncompliance with the two federally man-
dated or four optional participation requirements.3 0 In addition,
states have imposed their own conditions of participation.3 Though
most states have some type of grievance procedure for sanction ap-
peals, there is large variation among the states in this regard. 2 This
variation ranges from refusing to grant extensions for failure to com-
ply with program requirements to requiring a strict review procedure
before a sanction can be imposed. 3
On the other hand, PRWORA champions might argue that AFDC
had the vice of the PRWORA virtue. AFDC's entitlement feature de-
valued individual responsibility. 4 The three-decade reform impetus
that culminated in the Welfare Reform Act had this concern at its
core. Robert Rector asserts that the intent of welfare reform was to
"shift the focus from material to behavioral poverty" and that full-
28. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970) (finding that heightened
due process protections of a pre-termination evidentiary hearing are necessary when the
benefits at stake involve the fulfillment of essential human needs); see also Cimini, supra
note 2, at pt. II (describing the shift from an entitlement program to a discretionary pro-
gram and the accompanying reduction in procedural safeguards).
29. Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. II.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (Supp. V 1999) (providing for the elimination or reduction of
TANF funds to families in which an individual refuses to work as required by statute); id.
§ 608 (a) (2) (providing for the elimination or reduction of TANF funds to the family of an
individual who fails to cooperate with the state in establishing paternity or obtaining child
support). The optional participation requirements for which sanctions can be imposed
include failure to comply with an individual responsibility plan, id. § 608(b) (3), failure to
work toward receiving a high school diploma or its equivalent, id. § 604(j), failure to en-
sure school attendance by children, id. § 604(i), and a positive controlled substance test, 21
U.S.C. § 862b (2000).
31. See, e.g., STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, REQUIRED SEQUENCE OF WORK Ac-
TIVTIES, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/work.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002) (pro-
viding a listing of states that require individuals subject to the work requirement to
participate in enumerated work activities). For a list of tables produced by the State Policy
Documentation Project that study the state welfare programs, see generally STATE POLICY
DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES, available at http://
www.spdp.org/tanf/work.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
32. For a discussion of this variance, see Ladonna Pavetti & Dan Bloom, State Sanctions
and Time Limits, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 245, 245-64 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Has-
kins eds., 2001).
33. Id. at 252-53.
34. See Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. I.B (describing the motivation for the Welfare Re-
form Act).
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check sanctions are an important part of state arsenals in moving peo-
ple off the rolls.35 Professor Cimini's unease that the result of the
Welfare Reform Act's devolved contractual model is to deprive recipi-
ents of due process protections is well grounded. 6
Empirical evidence supports Professor Cimini's claim that the ab-
sence of automatic administrative review procedures can cause recipi-
ents to suffer the abuse of arbitrary and unfair decisions. 37 Yet
possibly, the lessening of recipient rights witnessed in the increased
discretion of state devolution was an implicit intent of the PRWORA.3 s
There is no question that states are utilizing the wide latitude the Wel-
fare Reform Act gives them. For example, one three-city study found
that only twelve percent of sanctions were for not taking ajob or par-
ticipating in ajob related activity, one of the two federally mandated
sanctions.3 9
II. RESORTING TO THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF CONTRACTS AS
A SOLUTION
As Professor Cimini asserts, the dominant features of the de-
volved contractual model under TANF are too few rules and too much
agency discretion.4 ° This is clearly the case in the area of sanctions.
35. Robert Rector, Comment, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 32, at 264,
265-66.
36. See Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. II (discussing the dangers posed by the increased
discretion of welfare workers to fair and equal welfare services).
37. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALrH & HUMAN SERVICES, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR
NEEDY FAMILIES: EDUCATING CLIENTS ABOUT SANCTIONS (1999) (examining how eight states
inform clients about sanctions).
38. Lawrence Mead notes that the WRA
claims to devolve responsibility for welfare to the states, but it also levies on them
unprecedented mandates to raise participation in work activities and toughen
child support enforcement .... In short, some dimensions of the act weaken
federal mandates and funding, whereas others strengthen them. What ties it all
together is a determination to hold both states and recipients responsible for
good outcomes.
Lawrence M. Mead, The Politics of Conservative Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WEL-
FARE, supra note 32, at 201, 212 Others have pointed to the
new flexibility to redesign the way they handle clients to introduce new organiza-
tions, with different missions and capacities, into welfare systems. These changes
have altered the "signals" of welfare programs, that is, the basic messages about
what the welfare program offers to clients as well as what it demands in return.
Thomas L. Gais et al., Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE, supra note 32, at 35, 38.
39. Andrew Cherlin et al., Sanctions and Case Closings for Noncompliance: Who Is Affected
and Why (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.jhu.edu/-welfare/18058_Wel-
farePolicyBrief.pdf (describing types of sanctions mandated or allowed by federal law).
40. Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. II. It can be argued that even under the old AFDC
system of moribund rule books there was too much administrative discretion. Discretion in
20021
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The Welfare Reform Act permits states to develop Individual Respon-
sibility Plans "in consultation with the individual."'" These plans allow
states to impose penalties on those who fail "without good cause to
comply with an individual responsibility plan signed by the individ-
ual. '4 2 Professor Cimini offers these written agreements, called Indi-
vidual Responsibility Plans or Individual Responsibility Contracts in
the states, as the foundation for a due process protection claim.43
Most states have adopted plans or contracts (IRPs)."4 These IRPs
detail the assorted requirements for participation and, in some states,
the assistance and support to be provided by the government.45 The
IRP is signed by both the recipient and the government agency
caseworker.46 Recipient noncompliance with IRP stipulations is cause
for the state to reduce or terminate benefits.47 Clearly, recipients are
in a precarious position when it comes to state sanctions for noncom-
pliance with provisions of the IRP. This is particularly true in states
where the state responsibilities are not spelled out in the IRP.
Yet, it is in these IRPs that Professor Cimini finds a plausible basis
of due process protection. Using social contract theory, as reflected
in American governance documents and traditions and private law of
contract norms, as the intellectual and legal bases of her argument,
she makes the case that the IRP establishes an enforceable contract
between government and recipient." Thus, the property rights that
reside in contracts entitle recipients to due process protections.49
Professor Cimini's argument about the mutuality of expectation
and the affirmative obligation on the government is a persuasive one.
Indeed, beginning in 1935 the safety net focus of social welfare policy
welfare administration is not a new problem, although the lack of due process protection
is. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 3-4 (1980) (arguing that the discretionary administration of agency policy
is the, nature of street-level bureaucracy); see also Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement
in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc. SERV. REV. 3 (1984); Marcia K. Meyers et al., On the Front
Lines of Welfare Delivery: Are Workers Implementing Policy Reforms?, 17 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MAN-
AGEMENT 1 (1998).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
42. Id. § 608(b) (3).
43. Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. III.B.2.
44. See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS,
available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/prc/index.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2001) (indicat-
ing that although states are not required to provide IRPs, thirty-five states require recipi-
ents or applicants to complete an IRP).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2) (describing the suggested contents of an IRP).
46. For an example of such an IRP, see Cimini, supra note 2, App. 1.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (3).
48. See Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. III.
49. See Cimini, supra note 2, at pt. III.B.2.
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has implied a social contract between government and the poor.' °
However, much of the post-1960s discussion in the polity charges the
government with doing too much.5 The debate ensued as a result of
demographic changes in the welfare population and concerns about
the behavior of recipients.52 Proposals for workfare, work first,
wedfare, and marriage bonuses have been grounded in this view of
what welfare receipt required of its recipients. 3 The discourse about
mutuality has focused on shortcomings or lack of accountability of
recipients, not government. 4
III. POLITICAL WILL AND LEGAL DISPOSITION AS IMPEDIMENTS TO AN
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS STRATEGY
The Welfare Reform Act is the triumph of behavior over need as
a guiding philosophy in aiding the poor.55 On the eve of TANF
reauthorization it is not clear that the political support and public will
exist to alter this outlook. To the extent that the courts reflect politi-
cal winds, the shift to an enforceable contract basis for due process,
from the previous legal entitlement grounds,56 may not be successful
in restoring the power imbalance between TANF recipients and gov-
ernment in welfare administration.57
The contracts route to due process protection may encounter dif-
ficulty on two fronts. First, politics informs welfare policy choices58
50. See Cimini, supra note 2, at 276 (stating that the "New Deal marked the creation of
a social contract on the federal level").
51. See TRAr-NER, supra note 24, at 362-87 (discussing the conservative attack on the
welfare system during the 1970s and 1980s).
52. See Skocpol, supra note 19, at 303-07 (discussing the erosion of support for AFDC as
its population changed from white widows to blacks and single females).
53. See Douglas J. Besharov & Timothy S. Sullivan, Welfare Reform and Marriage, 125 PuB.
Ir. 81, 94 (1996) (arguing that marriage ought to be as emphasized as job training and
work, and that changes in the welfare law are premised upon the idea that "they will en-
courage mothers to leave welfare for work").
54. See MnAD, supra note 19, at 3 (arguing that the welfare state is too permissive);
MELNICK, supra note 17, at 280-81 (discussing how concerns of "fault, responsibility, and
incentives" play an important role in discourse about entitlement programs as evidenced
by 1980s reform efforts to modify recipients' behavior).
55. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTy OF WELFARE REFORM 89-109 (1995) (arguing that
current attempts to reform welfare "reflect a consensus that poverty is primarily behavioral
rather than economic or environmental").
56. The Supreme Court recognized welfare as an entitlement in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). In this decision, the Court stated that welfare benefits are "more like
'property' than a 'gratuity.' Id. at 262 n.8.
57. See BUssIERE, supra note 17, at 167 (stating that beginning in the 1970s welfare
reformers were left with "nothing to fall back on in the judicial arena").
58. SeeJoe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief. Explaining State Policy Choices in the Devolu-
tion Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 378 (2001) (presenting a political analysis of state re-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
and the political will is not in sync with this approach.5" Second, the
reception by the courts may be less than hospitable.6 °
Professor Cimini notes the emphasis on jobs and work require-
ments begun in the 1988 Family Support Act.6 However, in the even
earlier 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act,62 Congress re-
quired states to expand their workforce participation requirements
for single mothers receiving public assistance. 63 The 1967 Work In-
centive Program (WIN) mandated that needy children could be re-
moved from welfare rolls if the parent refused to participate in work
training or employment.64
Politically, the entitlement model was under attack by both the
executive and legislative branches well before the enactment of the
Welfare Reform Act.65 Presidents since 1935 warned of the negative
effects of public assistance relief. Franklin Roosevelt cautioned in his
1935 State of the Union address that "to dole out relief in this way is to
administer a narcotic . . . . It is in violation of the traditions of
America. Work must be found for able-bodied but destitute work-
ers."66 Roosevelt's warning was a harbinger of the welfare reform
rhetoric that followed in ensuing decades. 67
President Clinton's pledge in a 1993 address to Congress to "end
welfare as we know it" reflected a prevalent view among both liberals
sponses to the new federal welfare policy environment); see also MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 24-25 (1999) (asserting that while "social and political structures
influence government policy," evidence also supports the notion that "public attitudes
shape government policy in important ways").
59. See infra text accompanying note 71 (discussing public expectations).
60. See infta notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing courts' possible treatment
of due process rights connected to social service or welfare programs).
61. Cimini, supra note 2, at 257 (discussing the obligations imposed on recipients
through the Family Support Act of 1988).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 630 (1988) (repealed 1990).
63. See id. §§ 630-632.
64. See TRATrNER, supra note 24, at 330 (stating that the Work Incentive program,
which "disqualified adults and older out-of-school children from A.F.D.C. payments if they
refused to accept employment or participate in training programs," was based upon the
resurgent notion that poverty was the product of individuals, not the political economy).
65. Piven & Cloward, supra note 12, at 87 (discussing 1981 AFDC changes proposed by
the Reagan administration and approved by Congress that resulted in the termination of
payments to 400,000 working mothers).
66. Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (1935), available at http://
www.albany.edu/faculty/gz580/hisl 01/su35fdr.html.
67. For an analysis of the emphases Presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to William Clin-
ton have put on welfare reform in their public addresses, see Cheryl M. Miller, Presidential
Advocacy of Welfare Reform:from Roosevelt to Clinton, in 8 NATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW,
THE POLITICS OF THE BLACK "NATION": A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR RETROSPECTivE 171 (Georgia A.
Persons ed., 2001).
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and conservatives." Unlike social insurance programs," welfare pay-
ments are not "earned" and thus do not easily fall in the contractual
model in the minds of the public or elected officials.70 Inasmuch as
an obligation, contractual or otherwise, is expected by welfare recipi-
ents, the public expects more from these recipients than from the
beneficiaries of social insurance programs."1 There will have to be a
sea of change in public opinion to shift welfare discourse away from
the problem of whether recipients "deserve" benefits to the problem
of state welfare agencies not honoring their obligations to recipients.
Let me express this observation more bluntly. The public percep-
tion is that the drastic caseload reduction since the enactment of the
Welfare Reform Act is an indicator of success, whatever the employ-
ment or economic status of welfare leavers.72 Given the prevalence of
the view that people should be working, not receiving public assis-
tance, it will be difficult to get the problem of arbitrary or capricious
benefit cuts on the radar screen of the public and institutional elites.7"
68. In 1993 President Clinton did not give a State of the Union Address in January.
Instead, on February 17, 1993 he gave a "New Direction Address before a Joint Session of
Congress," where he made this comment. William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Ses-
sion of Congress on Administration Goals (Feb. 17, 1993), available at http://www.c-
span.org/executive/stateofunion/sou93-trans.asp.
69. Piven & Cloward, supra note 12, at 46 (asserting that programs for the elderly "en-
joy virtually unanimous favor"); GILENS, supra note 58, at 27 (finding that strong support
for social spending exists "with regard to the elderly, health care, education, and child
care").
70. See HANDLER, supra note 55, at 30-31 (discussing the conservative view that there is a
"moral responsibility" to work, and those who do not work are therefore "undeserving" of
social welfare benefits).
71. Welfare recipients, because they are deemed undeserving of welfare benefits, must
meet mandatory work requirements in order to receive benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 607
(Supp. V 1999) (outlining the terms of the mandatory work requirement); see a/S0JOEL F.
HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY 132-42 (1991)
(describing the recent history and implementation of mandatory work requirements).
72. There is a great deal of disagreement about how leavers have fared. SeeJared Bern-
stein & Mark Greenberg, Reforming Welfare Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, available at
http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/1/bernstein-j.html (concluding that in terms of
earnings and overall impacts on families, the 1996 welfare reform efforts have not disad-
vantaged the poor to the extent opponents of that reform predicted); Lawrence Mead,
Welfare Reform: Meaning and Effects, POL'Y CURRENTS (American Political Science Assoc.,
Ind.), Summer 2001, at 10-11 (listing various outcomes of welfare reform that indicate
uncertainty about its ultimate success or failure); ROBERT F. SCHOENI & REBECCA M. BLANK,
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REFORM DEBATE 32-36 (1998) (noting that although the general public is unhappy with the
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note 58, at 24-26 (claiming that history reveals that public attitudes foreshadow govern-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
What of court reception to the claim that IRPs, as "legally cogni-
zable contracts," endow recipients with property rights subject to
Fourteenth Amendment protections? If due process protection is to
be gained in this manner, it will be very important to choose the right
case to pursue it.
A further problem in court review may be posed by the increasing
privatization of social services and welfare administration under TANF
noted by Professor Cimini. 4 This administrative complexity may
make it more difficult for recipients to prevail in the courts arguing a
due process right based on contractual obligations. Professor Cimini
offers both the "public forum" and "entanglement" exceptions as ways
to hold states liable for the actions of those to whom they delegate
welfare administration.75 However, both principles have a mixed re-
cord of acceptance by the courts.7 6
The federal courts have a varied and conflicting record in pro-
tecting the rights of welfare recipients. The Court that decreed
Goldberg v. Kelly,77 ruled in the same year in Dandridge v. Williams,7 8
that welfare was not a constitutional right.7 9 In his Goldberg dissent,
Justice Black stated that "new experiments in carrying out welfare pro-
grams should not be frozen into the constitutional structure but
should be left to legislative determination."8 " A case brought along
the lines outlined by Professor Cimini may receive a similarly con-
structed response, rather than the hoped for goal of restoring due
process protections to welfare administration.
CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, the proce-
dural protections and legitimate expectations affirmed under Goldberg
v. Kelly have eroded. Professor Cimini offers a potent strategy of how
to regain procedural protection in benefit reduction and termination
decisions. Pending a court challenge, it remains to be seen if a prop-
ment policy 66% of the time, and that Americans are "hostile toward ... government
responsibility for social welfare").
74. See Cimini, supra note 2, at 263. An explication of these issues is found in Barbara
Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government
Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1559 (2001).
75. Cimini, supra note 2, at 291.
76. Id. at n.255.
77. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
78. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
79. See id. at 484. For a discussion of this case, see BUSSIERE, supra note 17, at 107-11,
146-50.
80. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).
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erty claim of legally cognizable contracts can provide a new and solid
legal tool for due process protection. Ironically, Goldberg v. Kelly
might even serve as a precedent in that it mandated a hearing before
benefit termination.8 In this comment, I have focused on the politi-
cal and legal impediments this suggested strategy of ensuring due pro-
cess may encounter.
81. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
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